In Italy, trade unions have legal personality as defined in Article 39, paragraph 4, of the Constitution: partly on the basis of the principle that legal persons are merely organisations of natural persons, and partly on the basis of the legal interpretation of the word “person”, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that certain constitutional rights protect legal persons (such as corporations and others). organizations). Santa Clara County, V. Southern Pacific Railroad is sometimes cited for this conclusion because the court reporter`s comments included a statement by the Chief Justice made before the hearing began, telling counsel during the pre-trial conference that “the court does not wish to hear arguments as to whether the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting a State from denying a person within its jurisdiction the The same protection of the law applies to these organizations. We all agree that this is the case. An important aspect of a legal entity is that you fit into at least one legal platform, which means you own the claims and charges related to that platform. I call this annex: legal platforms linked to legal persons. How one-man businesses like Mary Inc. and Scottish trusts, multiple legal platforms can be attached to a single legal entity.27 (If this were not the case, it might not be necessary at all to distinguish “legal platform” from “legal person”.) As mentioned above, the supposed recognition of the legal personality of idols and rivers by legal systems can lead to an “anything goes” view of passive legal personality, according to which a legal system can treat virtually anything as a legal person. Such a temptation must be resisted. It is clear, of course, that a legal platform can be linked in some way to almost any physical object.
The legal platform “Te Awa Tupua” is linked to the existence of the Whanganui River: if the river ceased to exist (perhaps due to a natural disaster), the corresponding legal platform would probably also be dissolved. I call it a weak link. A weak connection of a platform to an entity means that the existence of the platform depends on the existence of the entity, just as the existence of the natural legal platform “John Smith” depends primarily on the life of John Smith.34 The legal regime regarding the Whanganui River differs in this respect from a typical society. However, this weak link from a legal platform to a physical object does not yet constitute the legal personality of the object of attribution. Take, for example, an organization whose purpose is the preservation of a particular ancient manuscript. Suppose that if the manuscript is destroyed, the organization is dissolved. The organization`s legal platform is therefore weakly attached to the manuscript. However, the manuscript is not a legal entity. For example, let us say that two villages on nearby islands form a joint firefighting organization responsible for extinguishing fires on both islands. However, the representatives of the two villages are aware that the old bridge connecting the two villages will only remain functional for a few years, and it is therefore agreed that the organization will be dissolved as soon as the bridge is no longer functional. However, the bridge is not a legal entity.
In short, a weak link alone cannot create the legal personality of the object of the seizure. Consider the legal status of a child as opposed to, say, a non-human animal (in a typical contemporary legal system). First, the child has various rights of claim “against the world” that primarily protect the child from physical and psychological harm.36 The scope and severity of these protections are much greater than those afforded to animals. Sensible adults also have such rights, although they may have the right to waive them in certain circumstances. However, there is one type of right of claim that is necessary for the functioning of a child`s legal person, but not for that of an adult: a child has fiduciary rights related to its legal platform. If a child is abused, it is the responsibility of the child`s representative(s) to seek redress from the abuser and administer compensation in the best interests of the child; Representatives may not use the allowance in their favour. The claim that a company (even with the caveats above) could be a legal entity may seem far-fetched, but such claims are actually made. Ngaire Naffine, who has classified representations of legal persons, suggests that many so-called legalistic positions – according to which legal persons are something inside the law – agree with such a view. Naffine supports the following summary of the legalistic position: “Everything can be a legal person because legal persons are fixed or defined as such.” 5 That would be a non sequitur, for reasons I will discuss later; However, most of the authors whom Naffine calls legalists do not share, according to my reading, the position she attributes to them. F. H.
Lawson seems to support such a position when he asserts that “[t]he existence of a [legal] person is required for the legislature, whether legislator, judge or jurist, or even the general public, to decide to treat it as a subject of rights or other legal relationships.” Some theorists, such as Bryant Smith, argue that the legal person is nothing more than legal relations: since legal personality is a prerequisite for legal capacity (the ability of any legal person to modify (conclude, transfer, etc.) its rights and obligations), it is a prerequisite for an international organization to be able to sign international treaties in its own name. Brazilian law recognizes any association or abstract entity as a legal entity, but a registry is required by a constitutional document, with specifications that depend on the category of legal entity and the local law of the state and city. Section 28 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states: ” the provisions of this Bill of Rights apply, to the extent possible, for the benefit of all legal persons and all natural persons. A distinction must be made here between doctrinal questions and philosophical analysis. Stone`s writings are enshrined in the U.S. legal system, in which a plaintiff has standing in a typical case only if he or she has suffered or threatens to suffer direct harm or injury as a result of the defendant`s past, present, or future conduct. If such a doctrine of legal validity exists, and if the only legally recognized damage is damage caused to legal persons, the obligation not to cause environmental damage is real (and therefore enforceable) only if the environmental damage affects the clearly identifiable interests of a legal person.